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Abstract

E-commerce applications have flourished on the Internet because of their ability to
perform secure transactions in which the identities of the two parties could be verified
and the communications between them encrypted. The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
protocol is implemented to make secure transactions possible by creating a secure tunnel
between the user’s browser and the server with the help of Certificate Authorities (CAs).
CAs are a third party that can be trusted by both the user’s browser and the server and are
responsible for establishing secured communication between them. The major limitation
of this model is the use of CAs as single points of trust that can introduce severe security
breaches globally. In my thesis, I provide a high-level design for a new protocol in the
application layer of the TCP/IP suite that will build a secure tunnel between the user’s
browser and the server without the involvement of any third party. My proposed protocol
is called User-Defined Key Pair (UDKP), and its objective is to build a secure tunnel
between the user’s browser and the server using a public/private key pair generated for
the user on the fly inside the user’s browser based on the user credential information.
This key pair will be used by the protocol instead of the server certificate as the starting
point for creating the secure tunnel.
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Introduction
The average person has now become more dependent on the Internet in their daily life,
allowing a wealth of information to be derived from Internet traffic. This information
motivates malicious users to develop new techniques to steal that information; therefore,
Internet traffic requires a mechanism to prevent eavesdropping, tampering and spoofing
attacks. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol provides this type of Internet
protection by creating an encrypted tunnel based on the public key infrastructure (PKI)
technology. PKI allows two parties without a previous relationship to use Certificate
Authorities (CAs) to share the security parameters required to create a secured tunnel
between them [1]. A CA is the organization that issues and manages the security
credentials and certificates required for verifying the identities of the involved parties.
Browser vendors usually embed a copy of the root certificates for a set of CAs that they
decide to trust, which helps the end user in deciding whether to trust a particular
certificate. When a browser receives a website certificate that is signed by one of those
CAs, it will automatically trust the website on behalf of the user. As one final check,
browsers can use the information in both the website certificate and the certificate of the
CA to verify that the certificate has not been revoked by the CA.
Although PKI has been widely deployed and is used in most secured websites, security
professionals have expressed numerous concerns regarding the nature of CAs as a single
point of trust. Specifically, if the CAs were compromised, severe security damages could
occur and many users would be at risk. Incidents in the past have revealed multiple types
of attacks upon CAs: those related to the failure of domain validation resulting in the
issuance of domain certificates to individuals who are not the domain owner and those
related to the malicious control of the computing resources maintained by CAs. As a
result of these breaches, attackers were able to fraudulently acquire trusted certificates for
different domains and services, allowing the attackers to transparently execute a man-inthe-middle (MITM) attack to view and manipulate the data being exchanged [2].
In my research, I will provide a high-level design for a new protocol in the application
layer of the TCP/IP suite that will create a secured tunnel between the user’s browser and
the server. My protocol targets the issue of using the CA as a single point of trust. Instead
of starting the process by receiving a certificate from the server that needs to be verified
by the CA, I will start the process from the user, who will send the server a message
signed with his private key generated on the fly from his credential information. The
signed message only needs to be verified by the server with the corresponding public key,
after which the session key will be generated by the server, encrypted with the user’s
public key and communicated to the user.

PKI Related Issues
Although PKI has been widely deployed and is used in most secured websites, security
professionals have expressed many concerns regarding the nature of CAs as a single
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point of trust. Various incidents that have occurred reveal different types of
vulnerabilities in the PKI security model. Some of these incidents are related to a lack of
domain validation, resulting in the issuance of domain certificates to individuals who are
not the domain owner. Other incidents are caused by failing to validate the certificate,
which results in the acceptance of a malicious certificate as a valid one. Still other
incidents are related to the malicious control of the computing resources maintained by
CAs. As a result of these breaches, attackers were able to fraudulently acquire trusted
certificates for different domains and services, allowing them to transparently execute a
man-in the-middle (MITM) attack to view and manipulate the data being exchanged [2].
Domain Validation Issues
Domain-validated certificates validate the ownership and control of the domain. They can
be issued from different CAs, sometimes with long life times. If the ownership of the
domain moves from one owner to other, it is possible that the previous owner has a
domain-validated certificate for the domain from a different CA. This certificate could be
used in conjunction with either a phishing attack or a DNS spoofing attack to masquerade
as a legitimate site and bypass the protection afforded by TLS.
Certain certificates can function as wildcard certificates that are issued for *.x.com, in
which case the certificate will be valid for me.x.com and you.x.com. A related issue with
this feature is that the CA only verifies the ownership and control of the x.com domain,
so a malicious user may issue a certificate for amazon.x.com and use it as a basis for
phishing attacks on amazon users.
One of the techniques used to verify the ownership of a domain is the use of an email
challenge-response mechanism to verify that the SSL certificate subscriber owns or
controls the domain that he asks to include in the certificate. This verification is achieved
by allowing the subscriber to select an address from a predetermined list including the
admin, root, and administrator addresses. If this list is not carefully made—for example,
if it includes email addresses that could be created for normal website users—other users
could obtain a domain-validated certificate [12].
Certificate Validation Issues
There are also issues related to the validation of the certificate at the client side. One
popularized issue is the null prefix attack that was publicly disclosed in 2009 and
impacted a number of applications, such as popular web browsers, instant messaging
applications, and email clients. In this attack, the attacker tricks the impacted application
into validating his website certificate as if it were the certificate of the target website. For
example, if we want to transparently run an MITM attack against paypal.com, we would
need a valid certificate for “paypal.com”, which we cannot obtain because we do not own
the paypal.com domain. However, we could obtain a valid certificate for the URL
“paypal.com\0.attackersite.com” if we own the domain “attackersite.com”. Now the
attacker, being MITM, will send the certificate that has been issued by a trusted CA to the
browser, and the browser will compare the destination URL and Subject field of the
6

Certificate to authenticate the server. Vulnerable browsers will use the code in (figure 1)
for comparison. The strcmp function will check every character of these values till it
reaches the end of the string denoted by nocharacter “\0”. In other words, the browser
will consider “paypal.com\0.attackersite.com” equal to “paypal.com”, and it will
accordingly accept the attacker certificate as if it were a paypal.com certificate [13].

Figure 1: Vulnerable Certificate validation code "Source:
http://palpapers.plynt.com/issues/2010Feb/null-prefix-attack/"

CA Computing Resources Attacks
Certificate authorities and registration authorities are the main source of trust in PKI; they
are the groups that are responsible for investigating the legitimacy of and endorsing
certificate requesters. This endorsement gives the requester full control over the traffic
related to the domain given in the subject field of the certificate and thus the ability to
capture sensitive data. Despite existing security measurements and security hardening,
attackers were able to enter the CAs infrastructure and issue themselves valid TLS
certificates for a series of famous domains that they did not control, such as Google,
Yahoo, and Mozilla.
Attacks on DigiNotar and Comodo are well-known examples of the malicious control of
CA computing resources to acquire valid certificates for high-value domains. In the case
of Comodo, the hacker, calling himself "Ich Sun," stated that he broke into Comodo Italy
using a very common database attack known as SQL injection, allowing him to execute
commands on the backend database server that are supposed to be prohibited. He then
took advantage of another flaw to obtain remote access to the system and eventually
found a password hard-coded into a file on one of the systems that ultimately allowed
him to issue the digital certificates [15].
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User Reaction to Un-trusted Certificates
People are always considered to be the weakest point in the security system. Although
PKI is publicly used, browsers still need to accept certificates that are not trusted and
deliver a warning to the user to warn him of the risks associated with visiting websites
with untrusted certificates. These warnings are common for many employees who use
intranet services provided by their organizations that do not pay yearly fees to protect
their intranet services, oftentimes because they believe that these services are already
protected by other in-place security measurements such as firewalls, intrusion detection,
intrusion prevention, and anti-viruses. When people become accustomed to ignoring
warnings generated from untrusted certificates, they will be more likely to ignore
warnings generated from real MITM attack.

Related Work
There has been an increased rate of security breaches against CAs, which has prompted
browser vendors, CAs and independent groups to start working on innovative solutions
and workarounds to mitigate the risks associated with the use of CAs. Significant efforts
have been made in this area, which I will describe in this section of the proposal.

Convergence
A new model for authentication, known as Convergence, was released by Moxie
Marlinspike in August 2011 and is based on previous work from Carnegie Mellon
University called the Perspectives Project [3]. Rather than trusting a hard-coded list of
CAs, Convergence allows users to configure a dynamic set of Notary Servers to validate
the client connection. When a client receives an https certificate from a site, it will
contact the Notaries and provide the host name, after which the Notaries will contact the
site, receive its certificate and forward it back to the client. If the client receives a
certificate that is different from everywhere else, it is likely that the certificate is
fraudulent. Convergence provides a trust agility in which any browser could easily ship a
default set of Notaries and then update them as needed without affecting the
functionality, which cannot be performed with the current PKI implementation. For
example, even if there is an issue with Comodo certificates, Comodo cannot be disabled
because a quarter of the web would also be disabled; on the other hand, the Notaries can
easily be replaced without affecting functionality [4]. However, Adam Langley, a Google
security researcher, stated that he does not think Convergence will be added to Chrome
because 99.99% of users would never change the default Convergence settings, which
would lead to a huge amount of traffic to the default Notaries [5].
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Certificate Patrol
Certificate Patrol is a plug-in implemented in Mozilla Firefox [6] that utilizes the fact that
website certificates change infrequently, with normal lifetimes of three to five years. The
key idea of Certificate Patrol is to build a dynamic mapping within the browser or in an
external database that maps TLS certificates to websites. A warning alarm is then raised
whenever the browser receives a different certificate for one of the websites in the map.
This solution does not require any change to the PKI because it is a plug-in that monitors
all SSL connections and determines if the certificate in question has been changed [6].
Although Certificate Patrol is good in concept, enterprise servers such as Google change
the certificate frequently, which would confuse the user with frequent warning messages
and cause the user to ignore those warnings.

Origin Bound Certificate (OBC)
Origin Bound Certificate (OBC) is a newly submitted RFC [7]; four researchers at
Google presented a new extension to the TLS protocol by using a client certificate
created on the fly by the browser without any user interaction. OBC does not include any
information about the user and is sent to the server during the TLS handshake phase. The
server binds the OBC to the authentication cookie later in the procedure. (See figure 2.)

Figure 2: TLS-OBC handshake "Source:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final162.pdf"

On subsequent visits to the website, the browser will send the existing OBC to the server,
which must verify that the public key in the certificate corresponds to the key used to
authenticate the client in the handshake. Thus, the MITM will have to send a new OBC
because he lacks the ability to forge the client’s OBC, and the new OBC will be detected
when the MITM forwards the user cookies to the server. (See figure 3.)
This approach cannot protect the first time the user accesses the website or the first visit
after the browser cookies are cleared, either by the legitimate user or by the MITM, but
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the browser can generate an alarm for the user at that time stating that the connection is
not trusted.

Figure 3:: Using OBCs and bound cookies to protect against MITM. The server
recognizes a mismatch between the OBC to which the cookie is bound and the
certificate of the client (attacker) with whom it is communicating. "Source:
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity12/sec12-final162.pdf
final162.pdf"

The next set of approaches uses DNS records to retrieve either the official certificate
itself or the official Certificate
ertificate Authority
uthority that issued the certificate for the website.
we
DNS
records are not digitally signed, which allows malicious users to easily manipulate DNS
records and poison the DNS cache. Thus, these approaches need to use the DNS Security
extension (DNS-SEC).

Certificate Policy Framework (CPF)
Certificate Policy
olicy Framework (CPF) was proposed in research published by Matthew
Lidestri in January 2012 [8]. CPF offers a mechanism for the service operators to control
which certificates are authorized to authenticate their services, with the help of a new
DNS recordd (CPF). CPF gives the service operator the flexibility to define an access
control list for each host name that declares which certificates should be passed and
which certificates merit alerts to the user or a blocked connection. Thus, any CPFCPF
compatible application can query DNS for CPF records to verify the integrity of the
certificate.
These actions are represented by the following qualifiers:
(+) Pass: Permit the connection. This qualifier can be omitted because it is the default
qualifier.
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(-) Fail: Block the connection and do not offer the user with a means to override.
(˜) SoftFail: Warn the user but allow them to override the error at their discretion.
A sample domain zone file for hostname “example.com” is shown in figure 4.
4

Figure 4:: sample dom
domain
ain zone file for the domain example.com "Source:
https://ritdml.rit.edu/bitstream/handle/1850/15220/MLidestriThesis2
https://ritdml.rit.edu/bitstream/handle/1850/15220/MLidestriThesis2-28-2012.pdf?sequence=1
2012.pdf?sequence=1"

In this example, the domain name www.example.com will accept certificatess with an
SHA-11 hash of 6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014a
6a0e9a60583c365eedafad7f4010965515dc014a, fail certificates
certificate with an
SHA-11 hash of 42ac0d3e30198c893a1f301939ace903019355ec and soft
soft-fail
fail any other
certificate representing the domain.

Certification Authority Authorization (CAA)
One of the main issues with the current PKI implementation is that the compromise of
any browsers’ trusted CAs or their children could be used to issue fake certificates to any
https-protected site because browsers will blindly trust certificates signed by any of the
trusted CAs. Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) DNS Resource Record is a
new technique to reduce this risk by allowing the website operators to specify which
public
ic CA can issue certificates for their domains [9]. Although this will significantly
reduce the risk of being dependent on the security of all browser
browser-trusted
trusted CAs by
depending only on the security of the authorized CA, the authorized CA can still be
compromised, which would place all https websites authenticated by that authorized CA
at risk.

DNS-based
based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE)
DNS-based
based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) is a working group that is
developing a protocol that would allow certificates to be bound to DNS names using
Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). DANE allows website operators
to store a copy of the SSL certificate directly in the DNS record for their websites, so
browsers can validate whether the SSL certi
certificate
ficate presented to them is the same
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certificate that the website operator provisioned on the operator’s website. DANE is
similar to the CAA solution because the security dependency is reduced to single entity,
but it differs from CAA in that it relies on the signature of the parent domain. For
example, the keys for "example.com" can only be signed by the keys for "com", and the
keys for "com" can only be signed by the DNS root [10].
Although these DNS-based approaches prevent any untrustworthy signer from
compromising anyone's keys except those in their own subdomains, the security of these
approaches is based on the security of the DNSSEC, so the integrity of the DNS keys
may be corrupted if the registrar for that domain is compromised. Thus, registrars still
theoretically have the power to abuse their position because they are responsible for
communication with the root servers.

Overview
The proposed protocol addresses the main TLS issue, the inclusion of a third party (CA)
in the process of authenticating and securing the traffic between the user’s browser and
the server, by making the process the responsibility of the user and server.
The consequences of using a CA as a third party responsible for securing a user’s
communication with the server is that the client encrypts the required security parameters
using a certificate received from some entity claiming to be the server. This claim is
supported by the attestation of the CA, which may lead to many types of MITM. For
example, another entity may manage to obtain a claim that it is the server and send a fake
certificate to the user’s browser instead of the real server certificate, thus taking
advantage of the fact that browsers will automatically trust any certificate signed by a
trusted CA or relying on the user to simply ignore browser warnings about untrusted
certificates. As a result, the user’s browser will create the secured tunnel based on this
fake certificate, exposing all of the traffic to the fake certificate owner.
In the proposed protocol, when the user tries to access a website, the browser will ask the
user to either go through a browser plug-in to be authenticated or to register the user
credential information if it is the user’s first visit to the website. Based on the credential
information provided by the user, the browser will generate a public/private key pair for
that user. Using that key pair, the secured tunnel is then created between the user’s
browser and the server.
In the next two sections, I will summarize the flow of messages between the user’s
browser and the server during the user registration and authentication.

12

User Registration
A user visiting the website for the first time will be asked to provide a username,
password, password confirmation, and the answer to one of ten available security
questions. This information will be provided to a browser plug-in and will be used to
generate the public/private key pair for the user, and the browser will use the generated
private key to sign the current timestamp of the server, which will act as a token. The
generated public key, username, and token will be sent to the server, which will in turn
validate the token using the received public key. The server will then generate the session
key, encrypt it with the user public key that it received from the user’s browser and send
it back to the browser. If the browser has the corresponding private key, it will be able to
read the session key and start communicating securely with the server. After the
successful setup of the secured tunnel between the user’s browser and the server, the user
will be redirected to the website registration page to complete registration at the website.
(See figure 5).
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Figure 5: User Registration

User Authentication
When the user visits the website later, he must be authenticated through the browser
plug-in, where the user will be asked to provide the username, password, and the security
question/answer pair chosen during registration to generate the same key pair. The
authentication will succeed only if the user provides the same information given during
registration. Otherwise, an invalid public/private key pair will be generated inside the
browser so that when the token, the signing of the current timestamp of the server with
14

the public/private key pair, is sent to the server with the username, the server will fail to
validate the token using the registered public key and immediately terminate the
connection with a fetal BAD_CERTIFICATE alert. (See figure 6).

Figure 6: User Authentication
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TLS-Based Implementation
TLS protocol is the current method used for PKI security and has been subjected to
different types of attacks in the past. Both TLS and its predecessor SSL have gone
through various security enhancements designed to reduce the risks inherited from the
nature of the PKI, which makes it an attractive starting point for developing any new
protocol that is related to the concept of creating a secured tunnel between two parties.
Although UDKP is completely independent of TLS, an investigation of the technical
details of the UDKP protocol reveals that UDKP is a modified version of the TLS
protocol that takes advantage of the security practices implemented in TLS after years of
practical experience. This similarity between TLS and UDKP will make the
implementation of UDKP much easier because it uses a similar message structure as that
in TLS protocol. UDKP uses fewer handshake messages than TLS, but the rest of the
UDKP sub-protocols have comparable sub-protocols in TLS, including SSL Change
Cipher Spec Protocol, The SSL Alert Protocol, and SSL Application Data Protocol.
In this section, we will give an overview of the TLS protocol details before describing the
technical details of the UDKP protocol. TLS is usually implemented on top of Transport
Layer protocols. It has been historically used primarily with Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP); however, it has also been implemented with datagram-oriented transport
protocols, such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and the Datagram Congestion
Control Protocol (DCCP). The TLS protocol is placed between the transport and
application layers (see figure 7), and it has two sub-layers. The lower layer is based on
either TCP or UDP protocol and essentially comprises the SSL Record Protocol that is
used for the encapsulation of higher-layer protocol data. The higher layer consists of the
following sub-protocols [14]:
SSL Handshake Protocol: responsible for negotiating the security parameters needed to
establish the secured tunnel between the client and the server
SSL Change Cipher Spec Protocol: allows the communication parties to put into
production and begin using the negotiated parameters.
The SSL Alert Protocol: used to exchange messages between the communication parties
to indicate any potential problems.
SSL Application Data Protocol: takes application layer data and feeds it into the SSL
Record Protocol for cryptographic protection and secure transmission.
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Figure 7: TLS Logical placement "Source: Rolf Oppliger, Ph.D. (2009). Ssl and Tls: Theory
and Practice, Artech House, Boston, London"

TLS is a layered protocol that is used to create a secured tunnel between the client and
the server to provide data privacy and data integrity; these goals are achieved through a
series of messages exchanged between the client and the server to authenticate each other
and to exchange the required keys for the security operations (see figure 8).

* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not always sent.
Figure 8: Message flow for a full handshake "Source: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt "
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The message flow starts from the client, who sends a ClientHello message and waits for a
ServerHello response message from the server. These two messages help the client and
the server agree on the Protocol Version, Session ID, Cipher Suite, and Compression
Method. After the ServerHello message is sent, the server sends its certificate followed
by a ServerKeyExchange message if they are required according to the ServerHello
message (e.g., the server might have no certificate, or it might have a certificate only for
signing and so needs a ServerKeyExchange message for encryption). At that point, the
server has sent all the data required from its side to establish the secured tunnel. The
server might now request a certificate from the client for client authentication, or it will
send the ServerHelloDone message. The server will then wait for a client response, which
will be the client certificate if the server has requested it. If the server did not request a
client certificate, the client will send the ClientKeyExchange message that may contain
either nothing or the PreMasterSecret (Once again, this depends on the selected cipher in
the ServerHello message). The PreMasterSecret is encrypted using the server public key
and communicated to the server. If the client has sent a certificate with signing ability, it
will send a digitally signed CertificateVerify message to prove his possession of the
private key in the certificate.
Finally, a ChangeCipherSpec message is sent by the client followed by a Finished
message, indicating that further communication will be protected using the new
algorithms, keys, and secrets exchanged in the handshake. In response, the server will
send its own ChangeCipherSpec message followed by a Finished message for the same
goal. At this point, the handshake is over, and the client and the server may begin to
exchange application layer data [11].
UDKP protocol differs from TLS protocol in the manner that it performs the handshake;
specifically, it uses a reduced number of handshake messages. However, the remainder of
the UDKP sub-protocols has parallels to TLS sub-protocols, including SSL Change
Cipher Spec Protocol, The SSL Alert Protocol, SSL Application Data Protocol, and SSL
Record Protocol.

Technical Details
The purpose of UDKP protocol is to provide a secured tunnel between the user’s browser
and the server using a set of messages. As I mentioned before, the messages exchanged
between the user’s browser and the server will be similar to the messages used in TLS 1.2
protocol to simplify the implementation of UDKP and to benefit from the best practices
and countermeasures that are utilized in that popular protocol.
Public Key Locator Handler
Although UDKP is similar to TLS in the structure of the messages, changes I made in the
handshake protocol prevent its implementation between the transport layer and the
application layer. UDKP protocol now needs to interact with the application layer to
18

locate the public key for a specific user. UDKP is not only responsible for encapsulating
packets coming from the application layer, which will move UDKP up to the application
layer, it must also interact with the authentication server to authenticate the user. The
server will receive the username from the browser in the authentication message, and
depending on the implementation decision, the received username will go from the
transport layer to the application layer to be used to locate the related public key. In my
Proof-Of-Concept (POC) implementation, I use a pre-configured public key locator
handler that knows how to locate the public key for a specific user, and I pass this handler
to the transport layer. In the POC, I have defined only one type of handler that knows
how to locate the user public key from any type of relational database, but in a real
implementation, there might be various types of handlers that are able to locate the user
public key from different types of storage (see figure 9).

Figure 9: UDKP public key locator handler

For the UDKP to be able to complete the handshake phase, the handler needs to be
configured in the server configuration file and the website deployment engineer needs to
both specify the handler type, which will be a database handler in our case, and provide
the required information to locate the user public key from the database (see figure 10).
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Figure 10: UDKP database public key locator handler configuration

Database handlers require the following information:
className: points to the implementation of the handler, which is a database locator
handler in this case. The development team has the option to define their custom locator
handler implementation, or they can use the default implementation provided by the
server.
driverName: indicates the database vendor that is used by the webserver to store the user
information; the database is mysql in this case.
connectionURL: contains the location of the database and the credential information
needed to connect to the database.
userTable: the table that contains the user information.
userNameCol: the column that contains the username.
userCredCol: the column that contains the public key for specific user.
registerURL: contains the URL to which the user will be redirected to complete the
registration into the website.
The complete scenario is given as follows: when the webserver starts, it creates the public
key locator handler based on the server configuration and then waits for incoming
connections on the UDKP port. When it receives a connection from a client, it will pass
the public key locator handler to UDKP. Using this handler, UDKP will know how to
authenticate the user when it receives the Authentication message from the user’s
browser.
20

Message Structure
The message flow begins when the user uses a UDKP-supported browser to access a
website that is protected with UDKP protocol on the UDKP-specific port. Before
initiating the message flow, the browser must ask the user to provide his credential
information to the UDKP plug-in (see figure 11).

Figure 11: Information message asking the user to access the website using the plug-in, and
in the lower part how to get access to UDKP plug-in

The UDKP plug-in has two modes of operation: the registration mode, for new users, and
the login mode, for existing users. In the registration mode, a new user will provide a
username, password, password confirmation, and select a security question to answer.
The general rule of thumb is that the password will never leave the user browser; instead,
the provided information will be used by the browser plug-in to generate a public/private
key pair (see figure 12).
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Figure 12: UDKP plug-in Register Mode

If the user is already registered in the website, he will go through the plug-in login mode
to provide his username and password, select the same security question that he selected
during registration and provide the same answer. This information will be used to
generate the same public/private key pair that was generated during registration (see
figure 13).

Figure 13: UDKP plug-in Login Mode

The browser is now ready to initiate communication with the server by sending the first
handshake message, the ClientHello message, after which it waits for the ServerHello
message response. Both of these messages are identical to their peers in TLS protocol.
Unlike TLS, UDKP will not send the server certificate or the ServerKeyExchange
message, as the security of the tunnel is no longer based on the server certificate.
Additionally, the client authentication will be through a message signed with the user
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private key that was generated inside the browser plug-in, so there is no need for the
server to ask for or receive the client certificate.
When the browser receives the ServerHello message, it will respond with the
UserAuthentication message. This is a new message that has been introduced in UDKP
and contains four fields: user_token, user_name, user_public_key, and auth_mode. The
user_name is the username for the user that is logging in. The user_token is constructed
by signing the ServerHello.random value, which contains the server timestamp; this will
protect against replay attacks. The user_public_key is the public key generated for the
user inside the user’s browser based on the user credential information. The final field is
auth_mode, which will contain a zero if the user is using the plug-in registration mode and a one
if the user is using the plug-in authentication mode. The user public key is mandatory only during
user registration – i.e., if auth_mode contains a zero – because during authentication the public
key would have been already stored into the server
struct{

UDKP_private-key-signed ServerHello.random user_token;
UserName user_name;
UserPublicKey user_public_key;
AuthenticationMode auth_mode;
} UserAuthentication;
Once the server receives the UserAuthentication message, it will check if auth_mode is
zero, indicating a registration attempt. In that case, the public key must be in the message,
or the connection will be terminated with a fetal no_certificate_RESERVED alert. If
user_public_key exists, the server will use it to recover its ServerHello.random value
from user_token using the user public key. If auth_mode was one, indicating that the user
is trying to be authenticated, the server will assume that the user is already registered and
will accordingly try to locate the user_public_key using the pre-configured public key
locator handler, which knows how to locate the user_public_key for the incoming
username. If user_public_key was found, the server will use it to recover its
ServerHello.random value from user_token using user_public_key.
If the server failed to recover its ServerHello.random value from user_token using the
user_public_key because of a missing or invalid user_public_key, the connection must be
terminated with a fatal BAD_CERTIFICATE alert. If the value is recovered, the server
will proceed to the next step by generating the pre-master secret that will be used to
generate all the required session keys that would be used during the session. The method
used to generate session keys is identical to that in TLS protocol. The PreMasterSecret
message is also identical to its peer in TLS protocol and is communicated to the user after
being encrypted with his public key so that no one can read it except the user himself,
who has the related private key.
struct {
UDKP_public-key-encrypted PreMasterSecret pre_master_secret;
} server_to_client_key_exchange;

23

When the browser receives the server_to_client_key_exchange message that contains the
encrypted PreMasterSecret, it will recover the PreMasterSecret using the user private
key. At this point, it will derive session keys from the PreMasterSecret, as specified in the
TLS protocol, and then send a ChangeCipherSpec message to notify the server that all
subsequent communications will be protected using the newly negotiated algorithms and
keys. Finally, the client sends the Finished message, which is the first message protected
with the new algorithms and keys. The Finished message contains a hash for all the
handshake messages received from the server so that the server can verify that the
security parameters the client is using are the same as those they both agreed to use and
demonstrate no manipulation. When the server receives the Finished message, it responds
with its ChangeCipherSpec message, indicating that it will move to the protected mode of
communication. Lastly, the server sends its protected Finished message. The
ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages are identical to their peers in the TLS
protocol.
At this point, the handshake is complete and both parties can communicate with each
other with confidence that their communication is authenticated and protected.

Implementation Considerations
There are some considerations that must be taken into consideration during the
implementation of UDKP to ensure the best possible security.
Firstly, the username that the user provides during registration must be the same as the
username in the registered profile because the key pair generated inside the browser,
which is sent to the server, is based on the profile username. If the user has the ability to
change his username from the website, the public key that was sent from the browser to
the server would be invalid because it would be based on the old username. Additionally,
the public key cannot be regenerated by the server because the other components that are
required to generate the key pair must not leave the user’s browser. My POC implements
the URL for the website’s registration page as part of the server configuration; then, once
the secured tunnel is created, the server redirects new users to the registration page,
where the page reads the username from the incoming request and displays it to the user
as a read-only field.
The second important consideration is that the username used in the plug-in login mode
must be the same username used to authenticate the user to the website. Therefore, once
the user is authenticated through the browser plug-in, he must be redirected to his home
page and not to a normal login page. If a user were redirected to a normal login page, a
MITM attacker would be able to set up a phishing attack against the user to steal his
credential information.
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Evaluation
In this section, various scenarios and use cases are studied and discussed to evaluate and
ensure the robustness of the protocol against various types of attacks. Our security
evaluation is based on a predefined threat model with a fairly broad scope that I believe
to be a real-world threat model. The other part of the evaluation uses the proof-of-concept
implementation to evaluate the performance of UDKP in comparison to TLS protocol.
Threat Model
In my threat model I will focus on the following types of attacks:
Registration Attack: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an MITM when the
user is registering his profile for the first time in the website.
Login Attack without Public Key: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an
MITM during the login operation without previous knowledge of the user public key.
Login Attack with Public Key: an MITM attacker is able to insert himself as an MITM
during the login operation and knows the user public key in advance; this knowledge may
be from a database attack or from the registration phase, where the user public key is
transferred in the clear.
Phishing Attack: the attacker manages to install his phishing website as a proxy between
the user and the real website in the hopes of stealing valuable information from the user,
and that attacker has previous knowledge of the user public key.
Registration Attack
This attack is related to the user registration phase. For the purpose of simplification, I
will consider the facebook.com website as an example, and I will assume that facebook is
protected using the UDKP protocol. To register in facebook, I will go through the
browser plug-in and provide my username, password, and the security question/answer
pair, after which I will connect to the facebook. At that time, the public/private key pair
will be generated inside the browser based on the provided information and the following
message will be sent from the browser to the facebook server for the sake of registration:
struct{
UDKP_private-key-signed Random user_token;
UserName user_name;
UserPublicKey user_public_key;
AuthenticationMode auth_mode;
} UserAuthentication;
If the MITM attacker delivers this message to the server, the server will respond with the
session key encrypted by my public key. Because my private key did not leave the
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browser, the MITM attacker does not have it and thus will not be able to read the session
key information or monitor the traffic (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: MITM attacker trying to perform a passive attack during user registration

The only chance for the attacker is to generate a different key pair and to send the newly
generated public key to the facebook server in place of mine. Then, when the facebook
server sends the session key premaster to me, it will be encrypted using the MITM
attacker’s public key. This allows the attacker to be able to read the session key premaster
and use my public key to re-encrypt the session key premaster and send it back to me. At
that time, the traffic will be exposed to the MITM attacker. However, the attacker is the
one who has registered at facebook and not me, so I will be using the attacker’s account.
Once I try to access facebook from a clean connection, I will not be able to access it
because the public key stored in the facebook is not my key, but the attacker’s key (see
Figure 15). This type of attack could be mitigated by first opening a server-authenticated
connection, then renegotiate a UDKP-authenticated connection with the handshake
protected by the first connection.

Figure 15: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during user registration by
sending his information instead of the victim information
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Login Attack without Public Key
As stated above, the public key is only mandatory during the registration; thus, if the user
was able to securely register in the website, he would have avoided the threat with the
most risk to his privacy. Let us consider again the facebook example. When the user
provides the username, password, and security question/answer pair to the browser plugin login mode and after the public/private key pair is generated by the plug-in for the
user, the public key has been already stored in the facebook server. The server then needs
to fetch the public key based on the received username to validate the user_token that
contains the ServerHello.random value signed using the user private key.
struct{
UDKP_private-key-signed Random user_token;
UserName user_name;
AuthenticationMode auth_mode;
} UserAuthentication;
If the attacker delivered the UserAuthentication message to the facebook server, the
server will try to read and validate the token using the user public key. If it succeeds, it
will respond with the session key premaster encrypted by the user public key. Because
the user private key did not leave the browser, the attacker will not be able to read the
session key and hence will not be able to monitor the traffic (see Figure 16).

Figure 16: MITM attacker trying to perform a passive attack during the user Login

The attacker may only be successful by already being a registered user in facebook and to
send his own Authentication message to the facebook server, which will then respond
with the session key premaster encrypted with the attacker public key. However, the
victim will be waiting for the session key premaster encrypted with his own public key,
and because the MITM attacker does not know the user public key, he will not be able to
communicate the session key premaster to the victim. Thus, the attack will be detected
and the connection will be terminated (see Figure 17).
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Figure 17: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during the user login by using
his username instead of the victim username, where the attacker does not know the victim
public key

Login Attack with Public Key
This class of attack is similar to the previous type of attack, but the MITM attacker
knows the victim public key either through a database violation or from when the user
registered in the website.
When the victim sends his Authentication message, the attacker does not pass it to the
facebook server. Instead, the MITM attacker sends his own Authentication message to
the facebook server, assuming that he is already a registered user at facebook, after which
the server responds with the session key premaster encrypted with the attacker public
key. The attacker then reads the session key premaster and re-encrypts it using the known
victim public key. However, once the handshake is over, as mentioned in the
implementation considerations, the username used in the plug-in login mode will be the
same user used to login the user into his account home page. Thus, the victim will
actually see the attacker facebook account, not the victim account, and he will be able to
detect the anomaly (see Figure 18).
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Figure 18: MITM attacker trying to perform an active attack during the user login by
replacing his username instead of the victim username, where the attacker knows the victim
public key

UDKP and Phishing Attacks
The main objective of phishing attacks is to steal the victim credential information
(username, password, and security question/answer pair) so that the attacker can have
access to the victim account later. In our case, this information will fortunately never
leave the user’s browser. Thus, phishing attacks with UDKP protocol will be for the sake
of traffic monitoring and they will follow the same patterns discussed previously.

Proof of Concept (POC)
For the sake of both demonstrating the functionality and proving the concept behind
UDKP protocol, I have made a simple implementation for the proposed protocol. In this
implementation, I have modified TLS protocol to reflect the new changes in the
handshake messages. I made the implementation to be as full-functioning as possible to
reflect the accurate performance comparison results. My POC environment is a virtual
machine that can work in four different modes: TLS Server, TLS Client, UDKP Server,
and UDKP Client.
In TLS Server mode, the machine runs the original versions of Tomcat 7 application
server, OpenJDK java runtime environment, and a forum web application.
In TLS Client mode, the machine runs the original version of Lobo web browser, and
OpenJDK java runtime environment.
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In UDKP Server mode, the machine runs the modified versions of Tomcat 7 application
server, OpenJDK java runtime environment, and a forum web application.
In UDKP Client mode, the machine runs the modified version of Lobo web browser, and
OpenJDK java runtime environment.
I then made two copies of this model virtual machine: one can work as either a TLS
Server or a UDKP Server, and the other can work as either a TLS Client or a UDKP
Client. This yields two identical environments to prove the concept behind UDKP
protocol and to measure the performance comparison of the TLS vs. UDKP protocols.
I have not written any application from scratch for this POC. Instead, I have modified
some of the existing open source applications. The following are the main components of
the POC:
1. Tomcat 7 application server (open source written in java).
2. Lobo web browser (open source written in java).
3. OpenJDK Java Run Time Environment 6 (open source written in java).
4. JForum web application (open source forum written in java).

Java runtime environment already contains the TLS protocol implementation; it acts as
the infrastructure upon which other java applications can operate. Lobo browser is the
client that initiates the TLS connection with the Tomcat application server using the TLS
implementation in the java runtime environment for preventing the interception or
monitoring of the traffic to the forum application. To simplify the task of implementing a
fully functioning UDKP protocol, I have modified the TLS implementation inside the
java runtime environment and changed the method that the communication parties
(Tomcat Application Server and Lobo Browser) use to communicate with TLS protocol.
Finally, I needed to make certain changes to the forum web application to support the
UDKP protocol; I will talk about these changes in detail in the next section.
I used the following procedure to evaluate the performance of the UDKP protocol in
comparison with the TLS protocol:
1. Run the TLS environment (TLS Client and TLS server virtual machines).
2. Start the Tomcat in the TLS Server virtual machine and run the Lobo browser in

the TLS Client virtual machine.
3. From Lobo browser in the TLS Client, request the forum application that is

deployed in the TLS Server machine and write down the milliseconds required to
handle that request (I modified the Lobo browser to print this value).

30

4. Issue the same request from the same browser window two more times and record

the corresponding milliseconds (for subsequent requests, the session would be
cached and the full handshake would not occur).
5. Repeat steps 1 to 4 three times and record the average number of milliseconds

required to handle the first, second, and third requests to the forum application.
6. Repeat steps 1 to 5, but run the UDKP environment (UDKP Client and UDKP

server virtual machines) instead of the TLS environment.
The results of the above procedure are summarized in the following table, which has two
parts: the first part is related to the TLS protocol, and the second part is related to the
UDKP protocol. I have three readings for the first request, which contains the full
handshake, and I also have three readings for the subsequent requests where the session is
retrieved from the cache.

Environment

First Request

Second Request

Third Request

TLS

7719

47

32

2593

31

16

2562

47

16

4291.33

41.66

21.33

5812

31

15

3141

47

47

3141

31

47

4031.33

36.33

36.33

Average
UDKP

Average

Table 1: UDKP and TLS performance comparison
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As we can see in the above table, the average values for UDKP requests are less than the
average values for TLS requests, but they are approximately the same. This is reasonable
because, although the server no longer sends its certificate, it still needs to verify the user
Authentication message through a database connection; thus, the cost is approximately
the same. However, one of the factors that control these measures is the number of users
in the database: if there are thousands of users inside the database, the authentication will
definitely take more time to complete. If we take into consideration that the handshake of
the UDKP not only secures the traffic to the server but also represents the authentication
operation for normal websites, we can conclude that the UDKP handshake has a better
performance than TLS.

Limitations
UDKP aims to completely replace the TLS protocol; however, the main limitation of
UDKP in comparison to TLS is the protocol layer. TLS protocol works in the transport
layer, meaning that TLS usage is transparent to the application. Thus, existing
applications can migrate easily from http to https without any change to the application
code. Unfortunately, this is not the case with UDKP, which works in the application
layer. To migrate existing applications to UDKP, it would require changes to the
application code. In this section, I will talk about the main limitations of UDKP.
Website Login Changes: according to the definition of UDKP, the application code must
not perform the login because the user must not provide the password to the website.
Once the user receives its website home page, he would have been already authenticated
by UDKP; otherwise, if the authentication failed in the handshake, the server must
terminate the connection with the user. If the user was successfully authenticated to the
server through UDKP protocol, the application should receive the username in the
request, and load the home page information for the user from the database using the
username received in the request instead of using the username and the password (see
Figures 19, 20).

Figure 19: The original code of JForum application (pseudocode). The user information is
loaded based on the username and the password provided from the website login screen
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Figure 20: JForum application code after modification (pseudocode). The user information
is loaded based on the username coming from the server with the request

There is one more required change for the UDKP authentication to work, which was
discussed previously. This change is the manner of telling the server where to locate the
user public key to be able to authenticate the user during the UDKP handshake. In my
POC, I have implemented this change through the concept of handlers, where the server
comes with a set of predefined handlers to handle different types of storage. We can have
database handlers to locate the public key in databases, LDAP handlers, or even custom
handlers that the website development team can define. I have implemented a database
handler to use in my POC; the deployment engineer needs to configure the server with
this handler in the server configuration file (See figure 21).

Figure 21: UDKP Server Configuration

Website Registration Changes: The registerURL is recommended for redirecting the user
to the registration page when a new user tries to register through the registration mode of
the plug-in. For security reasons, the user must register with the same username used in
the plug-in. This is because if the user changes the username in the website, the password
and security question/answer pair must also be provided to the website to regenerate the
public key. Providing the password and question/answer pair to the website is prohibited
according to UDKP protocol, so the web application must receive the public key and the
username from the browser plug-in and save them in the user database. In the registration
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page, the password fields must be removed as they are not required and the username
must be displayed as a read-only field (See figures 22, 23).

Figure 22: The original Forum registration page

Figure 23: The modified Forum registration page

Clear Username: The username is getting transferred in clear during UDKP handshake,
as it will be used to fetch the user key that is required to create the secure tunnel. This
risk could be mitigated by first opening a server-authenticated connection, then
renegotiate a UDKP-authenticated connection with the handshake protected by the first
connection.
User profile is required: For websites like search engines where the registration of the
user profile is not required to be able to use the website, UDKP will not be able to protect
the users' traffic to such websites.

Future Work
There are certain modifications that could be made to enhance UDKP security,
performance, and functionality. In this section, I give a list of those enhancements.
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Offline Brute Force Attack
UDKP is vulnerable to offline brute force attacks against the
server_to_client_key_exchange message that contains the session key premaster
encrypted with the user public key. This message is only readable using the user private
key. Although an MITM attacker does not have the user private key, he knows that the
private key has been generated based on the username, password, and security
question/answer pair using a known formula. Because the username is known to the
MITM as it is transferred in the clear, the MITM attacker can try all possible passwords
with all possible answers to the ten security questions to regenerate the public/private key
pair. The correct password would be the one that generates the correct key pair. Each
generated key pair would need to be tested by trying to decrypt the token that was signed
with the user private key. This is a very serious vulnerability and must be mitigated with
one of the following measures:
1. Forcing passwords to have a minimum complexity to make this offline attack

impractical. This complexity could be achieved by enforcing a minimum length of
eight characters, with different cases and at least one number or special character.
Additionally, the security questions must be chosen carefully so that each
question may have thousands of possible answers.
2. Another mitigation that could be implemented is to complicate the process of

generating the public/private key pair by making it time-consuming. This would
make a brute force attack impractical. For example, if the process of generating a
key pair consumed an additional second, it would not significantly affect the user
login operation but would make a brute force attack by generating all possible key
pairs impractical.
3. Finally, you can give the cautious users the option to replace the security

question/answer pair with a randomly generated key pair and to store that key pair
on a USB drive or smart card after encrypting the private key with the user's
password. That will add a significant amount of protection against a brute force
attack, and will achieve two factor authentication without modifying the
application code.
Unified Secured Key Pair Generation
An important part of the protocol is to generate the public/private key pair from the
username, the password, and the security question/answer pair. This generation must be
very secure and unified across all protocol implementations so that all browsers can
generate the same key pair from the given username and password. That means that all
the implementations must use the same security questions defined by the protocol.
These are the set of limitations and enhancements that need to be considered for the real
implementation of UDKP to achieve the best security and functionality expected from the
protocol.
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UDKP and SSL Termination
This is a new feature that allows the termination of secure traffic and its conversion to
unencrypted form at the load balancer or dedicated devices. This feature has many
benefits, mainly for increasing the site and web application performance by offloading
the handshake and cryptography work to dedicated hardware. One additional benefit of
the SSL termination feature is to centralize the related measurements and protection
against the common SSL attacks in one place. This also allows the application firewalls
to validate and check the incoming requests for application-level attacks such as SQL
injection and cross-site scripting.
SSL termination occurs by uploading your SSL certificate to the SSL termination device
or load balancer, at which point it terminates a user’s SSL browsing directly. In UDKP
protocol, there is no server certificate to be uploaded. Instead, the server will negotiate
the encrypted connection based on the user public key that is stored in the database
server. Unfortunately, the SSL termination devices are not involved in the user
authentication, so they will not have access to the user public key.
The proposed protocol could be modified such that the public key could be sent to the
server during the login authentication mode. The load balancer could use this public key
to encrypt the session key premaster secret and send it to the user. If the user is able to
read the session key premaster, he knows the related private key. However, the user could
generate any key pair and use it to authenticate any username, so as a final check, the
load balancer must send the username and the public key to the webserver to validate that
they are related to each other (See figure 24).
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The Internet

Encrypted

1) Client sends Username, Token, and Public
Key
2) Load Balancer will validate the token using
the received public key.
3) If valid it will convert the traffic to normal
http and forward the public key and the
username to the web server for
authentication, and finally the load balancer
will build the secure tunnel.

Load Balancer

Clear

Web Server

Web Server

Web Server

Figure 23: UDKP Termination

Password Change
According to UDKP, the password must not be provided to the website, it must be
provided through the plug-in. However, we must consider the case if the user needs to
change his password or he forgot his password. Then, the user must perform the related
operations through the plug-in to be in compliance with the UDKP protocol.
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In the case where the user wants to change his password, it is a simple process. The user
provides the old credential information, which includes the username, the password and
the security question/answer pair, and he will also need to provide the new credential
information. Then, the encrypted tunnel is established using the old credential
information, and the new public key is sent to the server to override the old key. The next
time the user accesses the website, he will be required to provide the new credential
information.
There are different methods to handle the case where the user forgot his password. One
method is to simply send a token to the email, or some other websites send this token to a
mobile phone that you had registered in advance with your account. Some online banks
require you to call the bank and answer some security questions, after which the
password will be reset to your visa pin code. The common behavior in all these options is
that you will receive a token in some manner, and you will use this token to prove that
you are the owner of your account and that you simply forgot your password. For UDKP
protocol, that token could be used as the seed for a temporary key pair that would be used
to prove that you are the legitimate owner of your website account, after which you can
create a permanent key pair.

UDKP and OpenId
The OpenId technology makes your internet navigation simpler by having only one
username and password to remember. The goal of OpenId protocol is to allow users to
sign on to different services with a single identifier, where the authentication itself is
performed by the OpenId provider. The OpenId provider will provide the user with an
authentication URL that the user can use at any website that supports this technology.
The supporting websites redirect the user to be authenticated to the OpenId provider on
behalf of the website. When you visit a website that supports an OpenId login, look for a
text box with an OpenId icon, type in your OpenId provider authentication URL, and you
will be redirected to the OpenId provider to verify your identity using your OpenId
provider credential.
One of the main security concerns related to the use of OpenId technology is phishing
attacks that trick users into giving away their OpenId authentication credentials. The
attacker does not have to attack the OpenId provider directly, but he can set up a
malicious website that will redirect the user to a phishing OpenId provider URL under the
control of the attacker. As a result, the user online identity could be impersonated. This
risk could be reduced by using the UDKP protocol, where your identity would be proved
to your OpenId provider using a message signed with your private key through the
browser plug-in. Then, the OpenId provider, who is responsible for confirming your
identity to other websites, only needs to keep your public key to validate your signature.
Thus, there is no need for any password to be transferred across the internet, preventing
any type of phishing attacks.
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Conclusion
The use of Public Key Infrastructure that is provided by commercial CAs has protected
the information that flows over the Internet from being compromised, and it is a key
solution for e-commerce applications to protect their customers. However, this model is
under increasing pressure to adapt to market realities, increasingly sophisticated users and
higher expectations of security on the public Internet. The proposed solution aims to
build traffic security without the need to be dependent on a third party to achieve this
protection.
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